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THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE: ADVOCATING 








A movement of activist ‘animal lawyers’ has recently arrived in Australia. 
This article contends that Australian lawyers have a significant role to play 
in advancing the animal protection cause. Part I discusses the philosophical 
foundation of the modern animal protection movement and describes the 
important theoretical divide that splits it into animal ‘welfare’ and animal 
‘rights’. Part II explains the Australian legal regime governing animal 
protection to show how the law acts as a site of exploitation. Part III 
explores the role of lawyers within the movement. It does this by appraising 
the obstacles in the way of animal protectionism and exploring what makes 
an effective lawyer advocate. It then uses a case study of battery hens to 
demonstrate the valuable role lawyers can play to support the animal cause. 
 
We are now at a new and strange juncture in human experience. Never has there 
been such massive exploitation of animals… At the same time, never have there 
been so many people determined to stop this exploitation.1 
 
Laws relating to animals have existed for centuries. However, a movement of 
activist ‘animal lawyers’ has only recently arrived in Australia. This 
movement seeks to advocate for animals and challenge deficiencies in laws 
that adversely impact upon them. There has been a surge of animal law 
activity in recent years, signalling the birth of the movement in Australia. A 
few examples include the rise of law schools teaching Animal Law;2 the 
advent of organisations such as Voiceless,3 the Barristers Animal Welfare 
                                                 
* BA/LLB (First Class Honours), Melbourne (2007). The author would like to thank John 
Tobin and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on a draft of this article. 
1 Wayne Pacelle, ‘Law and Public Policy: Future Directions for the Animal Protection 
Movement’ (2005) 11 Animal Law 1, 1. 
2 Voiceless, Where to study animal law (2007) Voiceless <http://www.voiceless.org.au/index. 
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=366&Itemid=312> at 1 June 2008. These include, 
among others, the University of New South Wales, Griffith University, Bond University, and 
the University of Sydney. 
3 Voiceless <http://www.voiceless.org.au/> at 1 June 2008. 
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Panel4 and Lawyers for Animals;5 major national law firms conducting pro 
bono work relating to animal welfare;6 and increased animal activism 
amongst law students through the Voiceless Animal Advocates program.7 
Given this flurry of activity and the likely persistence of the cause into the 
future, it is important to reflect on the nature of the broader animal protection 
movement and the specific role of lawyers within it. 
 
The central thesis of this paper is that Australian lawyers have a significant 
role to play in advancing the animal protection cause. It is therefore necessary 
to ask three primary questions: (1) What is the animal protection cause? (2) 
How is the law relevant to the cause? (3) What can Australian lawyers do to 
support the cause? 
 
Accordingly, this paper is divided into three parts corresponding to the three 
primary questions. Part I answers the first question. It discusses the origin 
and philosophical foundation of the modern animal protection movement and 
describes the important theoretical divide between animal ‘welfare’ and 
animal ‘rights’ that currently splits the movement. Initial thoughts will be 
offered on how this theoretical debate should proceed into the future. Part II 
answers the second question. It briefly charts the rising involvement of 
lawyers in support of the cause overseas. It also discusses the legal regime 
governing animal protection in Australia to show how the law acts as a site of 
animal exploitation. With the background in Part I and II having been 
surveyed, Part III expounds the central thesis by answering the third question. 
In order to determine the role of lawyers in assisting the cause, it appraises 
the obstacles in the way of the animal protection movement and explores 
what makes for an effective lawyer advocate. It then uses a case study of 
battery hens to illuminate the earlier, more academic, discussion. 
 
I WHAT IS THE ANIMAL PROTECTION CAUSE? 
 
The notion that animals are inferior to humans has a long history. Whether 
reflected in the Judeo-Christian view that humans have ‘dominion’ over all 
other forms of life8 or in the Aristotelian conception of animals as existing for 
the sake of humanity,9 the moral inferiority of animals is deeply embedded in 
our culture. For much of Western history, animals were thought to have no 
                                                 
4 Barristers Animal Welfare Panel <http://www.vicbar.com.au/e.1.12.asp> at 1 June 2008. 
5 Lawyers for Animals <http://lawyersforanimals.org.au/> at 1 June 2008. 
6 Clare Buttner, ‘Leading the way on animal welfare’ Lawyers Weekly, 11 May 2007, 14-5. 
7 Voiceless Animal Advocates <http://www.vaa.org.au> at 1 June 2008. 
8 Genesis 1:26. 
9 Aristotle, ‘Politics’ in Jonathan Barnes (ed), The Complete Works of Aristotle (1984) 1993-4. 
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direct moral claim on humans. In support of this, philosopher Immanuel Kant 
argued that animals were nothing but a means to human ends.10 Even today, 
the very fact that the word ‘animal’ is used in contradistinction to ‘human’ 
reflects the pervasive influence of the notion that humanity is separate to and 
above the rest of the natural world. 
 
At least two events provided the catalyst for a new understanding of animal 
ethics. One was the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species, which 
emphasised the continuity between humans and other species and displaced 
the creationist foundations of the earlier hierarchical views.11 The other was 
the moral claim of eighteenth century utilitarian philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham. Bentham argued that an individual’s capacity for suffering is what 
matters morally, not the capacity for reason or speech. We have direct 
obligations towards animals simply because, like humans, they can suffer.12 
 
A Benthamite recognition of animal sentience led to the enactment in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries of animal welfare statutes that prohibited 
the infliction of suffering in narrowly defined circumstances.13 However, it 
was not until the rise of other social justice movements in the 1960s and 70s 
that a more radical ethic with regard to animals was introduced into public 
discourse. 
 
 A Birth of the Modern Movement 
 
James Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin argue that philosophers ‘served as 
midwives’ of the animal protection movement in the late 1970s.14 Indeed, it is 
difficult to deny the considerable support shown towards animal 
protectionism by philosophy academics in the last few decades.15 A brief 
outline of the two most influential animal ethics philosophers is necessary in 
order to understand both how the animal protection movement began and 
why it is currently split into the factions discussed in Part IB. The following 
outline is not intended to argue for the truth of the philosophers’ views, but 
rather to provide a greater theoretical understanding of the movement. 
                                                 
10 Immanuel Kant, Lecture on Ethics, (translated by L Infield, 1963) 239-40. 
11 Roger S Fouts, ‘Apes, Darwinian Continuity, and the Law’ (2004) 10 Animal Law 99, 102-
3. 
12 Gary L Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (2000) 5. 
13 For a history of Australian animal welfare laws, see Philip Jamieson, ‘Duty and the Beast: 
The Movement in Reform of Animal Welfare Law’ (1991) 16 University of Queensland Law 
Journal 238. 
14 James M Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin, The Animal Rights Crusade: The Growth of a Moral 
Protest (1992) 90. 
15 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (2nd ed, 1995), 241-2. 
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1 Peter Singer 
 
The publication of Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation in 1975 is often thought 
to have launched the modern animal protection movement. Singer is a 
consequentialist, so he believes that the morally correct action is that which 
brings about the best overall consequences for all those affected by the 
action. As a preference utilitarian, Singer believes that the best consequences 
are brought about by maximising the satisfaction of preferences, such as the 
preference to avoid pain or the preference to continue living. In order to 
determine the best overall consequences, Singer argues that we must use the 
principle of equal consideration of interests. That is, ‘the interests of every 
being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same 
weight as the like interests of any other being’.16 
 
Singer argues that animals have a ‘like interest’ with humans in one 
important respect: they have an interest in avoiding suffering. If we fail to 
equally consider an animal’s interest in not suffering and a human’s interest 
in not suffering, we are guilty of ‘speciesism.’ This is similar to racism and 
sexism; however, instead of an arbitrary prejudice towards those with a 
particular skin colour or sex, it is an arbitrary prejudice in favour of our own 
species against other species.17 For example, let us consider a man who slaps 
a baby with his open palm. The man then whacks a horse with a large stick, 
so as to cause the horse the same amount of pain as that experienced by the 
baby. Singer argues that ‘if we consider it wrong to inflict that much pain on 
a baby for no good reason then we must, unless we are speciesists, consider it 
equally wrong to inflict the same amount of pain on a horse for no good 
reason’.18 
 
Singer’s arguments lead to radical conclusions about the way we treat 
animals. For example, if we must consider equally the interests of animals 
and humans in not suffering, it is difficult to justify the cruelty involved in 
intensive farming. Similarly, we could not justify painful scientific 
experiments on animals unless we would be willing to inflict the same 
amount of pain on human subjects. However, as a utilitarian, Singer does not 
believe that animals have ‘rights’ per se. All that matters, morally speaking, 
is that the best overall consequences are brought about after equally 
considering the interests of all those affected by your action. Therefore, 
                                                 
16 Ibid 5 (emphasis added). 
17 Ibid 6. 
18 Ibid 15. 
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neither animals nor humans have inviolable rights. This places Singer at odds 
with the second most influential animal ethicist, Tom Regan. 
 
2 Tom Regan 
 
In contrast to the utilitarian ethics of Peter Singer, American philosopher 
Tom Regan argued for a rights-based approach to animals in his 1983 work, 
The Case for Animal Rights.19 Regan argues that humans and some animals 
are ‘subjects-of-a-life’. That is, they possess qualities such as beliefs, desires, 
perception, memory, emotions, and an ‘experiential life’ in which they may 
fare well or badly ‘logically independently of their utility for others’.20 Regan 
believes that at least all normal mammals aged one year and over will satisfy 
his subject-of-a-life criterion. All subjects-of-a-life have ‘equal inherent 
value’ and an ‘equal prima facie right not to be harmed’.21 
 
Recognising the intrinsic value of humans and some animals entails 
recognising that they cannot be used as means to an end, regardless of 
whether the best overall consequences will be secured by such treatment. In 
taking this stance, Regan departs from the utilitarian ethics of Singer, arguing 
instead that all instrumental use of animals for such things as food, hunting 
and vivisection is wrong.22 
 
Of course, Singer himself regards most instrumental use of animals as 
unethical. However, this is because Singer believes the utilitarian calculus of 
the best overall consequences is not satisfied in relation to most uses of 
animals. Regan, by contrast, believes the instrumental use is itself a violation 
of animals’ intrinsic value. 
 
 B Theoretical Debates 
 
The influence of Singer and Regan on the animal protection movement is 
evident in the persistent division between supporters of animal welfare and 
supporters of animal rights. This division reflects fundamentally different 
ways of understanding the moral status of animals and the ethics of human 
practices that affect them. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983). 
20 Ibid 243. 
21 Ibid 329. 
22 Gary L Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Animal Welfare’ (1996) 48 Rutgers Law Review 397, 
419. 
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1 Animal Welfare 
 
Animal welfare is concerned with the humane regulation of animal use. It 
takes as its starting point the moral legitimacy of current institutional use of 
animals.23 For this reason welfarists do not seek to abolish human use of 
animals for food, sport, entertainment, fashion or science. Rather, welfarists 
argue that we need to ensure that we treat animals ‘humanely’ within those 
institutions.24 The primary aim of welfare supporters is to abolish 
‘unnecessary’ suffering within the accepted paradigms of the animals’ use. 
For example, welfarists are likely to oppose the confinement of pregnant 
sows to narrow crates on the basis that it is unnecessary, but have no problem 
with the farming of pigs for their meat per se. Welfarists also tend not to be 
concerned with the legal status of animals as property;25 indeed some argue 
that commodifying animals by designating them as property can be 
‘liberating’ for the animals, because people protect what they own.26 
 
Animal welfare is the underpinning philosophy of the RSPCA. On its website 
the RSPCA states that it ‘does not oppose the farming of animals. We just 
think they should be given a fair go’. The RSPCA believes that ‘if the animal 
is to be slaughtered, it should be done quickly and humanely’.27 As will be 
shown in Part IIB, animal welfare is also the underpinning philosophy of 
Australian animal protection statutes. 
 
2 Animal Rights 
 
The animal rights view provides a more radical and structural critique of 
current practices relating to animals. It supports the eventual abolition of all 
human use of animals.28 Animal rights supporters charge animal welfarists 
with inconsistency by arguing that it is arbitrary to limit the concept of 
‘unnecessary suffering’ to practices within the institutional status quo. The 
institutions (such as using animals for food) are themselves unnecessary. 
Animal rights advocates seek to abolish the property status of animals, 
arguing that only by according animals legal personhood can their interests 
                                                 
23 Jerrold Tannenbaum, ‘Animals and the law: property, cruelty, rights’ (1995) 62 Social 
Research 539, 575. 
24 Francione, above n 23, 397-8. 
25 See, eg, Robert Garner, ‘Political Ideology and the Legal Status of Animals’ (2002) 8 
Animal Law 77. 
26 Richard A Posner, ‘Animal Rights’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 527, 539. 
27 RSPCA, Fair Go for Farm Animals <http://www.rspca.org.au/campaign/fairgo.asp> at 1 
June 2008. 
28 Cass R Sunstein, ‘Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?’ in Cass R Sunstein and Martha C 
Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (2004) 4-5. 
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be adequately protected.29 Despite these counter-cultural aims, many animal 
rights supporters use a welfarist approach in their advocacy and campaign 
strategies, based on the belief that a rights approach is utopian and 
unachievable in the short term, and that incremental steps of humane 
regulation will lead to animals eventually being granted rights.30 Other 
animal rights supporters, such as legal academic Gary Francione, strongly 
criticise this view and insist on the pursuit of an ‘abolitionist’ agenda and the 
wholesale rejection of welfarism.31 
 
Animal rights is the underpinning philosophy of People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA). PETA argues that animals are not ours to eat, 
wear, experiment on or use for entertainment.32 Similarly, Animal Liberation 
Victoria aims to ‘abolish, and not merely regulate, institutionalised animal 
exploitation’.33 
 
The welfare/rights divide can be traced back to the philosophical variance 
between Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Regan unequivocally opposes 
institutions that use animals on the basis that this violates the rights of 
animals as bearers of intrinsic value. Singer is more ambivalent towards 
institutional use of animals and does not believe animals strictly have rights. 
However, because Singer believes that the interests of animals and humans in 
not suffering ought to be considered equally, his views are more radical than 
some advocates of the animal welfare view.34 
 
3 Care Ethics 
 
Of course, welfare and rights are not the only philosophical frameworks for 
animal ethics.  A noteworthy competing school of thought is ‘care ethics’, 
exemplified in the work of ecofeminist Carol Adams.35 On this approach, 
                                                 
29 Alan Watson, ‘Rights of Slaves and Other Owned-Animals’ (1997) 3 Animal Law 1, 6. 
30 Jonathan R Lovvorn, ‘Animal Law in Action: The Law, Public Perception, and the Limits of 
Animal Rights Theory as a Basis for Legal Reform’ (2006) 12 Animal Law 133, 139 and 142; 
Gary L Francione, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement 
(1996) 35. 
31 See, eg, Gary L Francione, ‘Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Normative 
Guidance’ (1997) 3 Animal Law 75; Francione, above n 23. 
32 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals <http://www.peta.org/> at 1 June 2008. 
33 Animal Liberation Victoria, About ALV <http://www.alv.org.au/about.php> at 1 June 2008. 
34 For more information on animal welfare and animal rights, see, eg, Robert Garner, ‘Animal 
Welfare: A Political Defense’ (2006) 1 Journal of Animal Law and Ethics 161; Francione, 
above n 23. 
35 Josephine Donovan and Carol J Adams (eds), Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring 
Ethic for the Treatment of Animals (1996). 
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rights are patriarchal and establish hierarchies between those who have rights 
and those who do not. Further, this approach argues that most rights and 
welfare models focus too heavily on abstract, rational concepts rather than 
integrating sentiments into their theories.36 Care ethicists argue that we 
should reject these abstract theories in favour of a more contextualised 
approach based on compassion. For example, one writer argues that we have 
moral duties to some animals because we enter into relations with them that 
make them dependent on us for their well-being, not because animals have 
rights or because we want to maximise utility.37 
 
In a similar vein, conservative Christian writer Matthew Scully argues that 
concern for animals should be based on human ‘mercy’ towards the 
vulnerable rather than the equalitarian arguments of philosophers such as 
Singer.38 Rather than rejecting the notion of human superiority, Scully argues 
that we are simply ‘abusing dominion, the first and greatest power given to 
man on earth’.39 The remedy is human compassion rather than animal 
liberation. 
 
4 Ecocentric Perspectives 
 
Other theorists extend the moral circle even further than non-human animals, 
to include ‘soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land’.40 
Proponents of ecocentrism argue that animals (including humans) are ‘just 
one constituency among others in the biotic community, just one particular 
strand in the web of life’.41 Accordingly, ecocentrism rejects the moral 
individualism of the other theories in favour of a more holistic view. 
Individual animals should not be the focus of our ethical concern. Rather, we 
should protect the integrity of ecological functioning because ecosystems 
have intrinsic value.42 Because ecocentrism focuses on the system, rather than 
                                                 
36 See, eg, Thomas G Kelch, ‘The Role of the Rational and the Emotive in a Theory of Animal 
Rights’ (1999) 27 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 1, 41. 
37 Daniel Engster, ‘Care Ethics and Animal Welfare’ (2006) 37 Journal of Social Philosophy 
521, 521 and 527. 
38 Matthew Scully, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to 
Mercy (2002) 20. 
39 Ibid 24. 
40 Aldo Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac and Sketches Here and There (1949) 204. 
41 Warwick Fox, ‘Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of Our Time’ (1984) 14 The Ecologist 
194.  
42 Ross Ramsay and Gerard C Rowe, Environmental Law and Policy in Australia: Text and 
Materials (1995) 16-32. 
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the individuals within the system, Tom Regan notoriously dubbed this view 
‘environmental fascism’.43 
 
 C Where to for Theory? 
 
Despite the diversity of theoretical perspectives, welfare and rights have 
emerged as the dominant models. The distinction between the two is not 
merely academic. Forming an opinion on the theory will affect the nature of 
the advocacy undertaken by lawyers and other supporters of the movement. 
First, it will affect the sort of projects considered worthwhile undertaking. 
Welfare proponents may consider it valuable to advocate for more cage space 
for battery hens, while rights proponents will probably only support the 
cage’s abolition. Second, it will affect the nature of the arguments employed. 
Rights proponents will argue that animals have a right not to be experimented 
upon, while welfare proponents will simply argue that some experimentation 
practices are unnecessarily cruel. Third, it will affect beliefs on how we 
should respond to animal cruelty in our individual lives. Welfare proponents 
may support eating meat that is sourced from organic or free-range farms, 
while rights proponents are likely to support the adoption of a vegan diet. 
Fourth, the split currently affects the ability of the movement to advocate 
effectively. The movement is more powerful if it is able to present a united 
front in its campaigns against animal exploitation.44 This is compromised by 
the internal division between welfare supporters and rights supporters.  
 
It is important to resolve the welfare/rights debate not only because it 
compromises internal unity, but also because, if rights advocates like Gary 
Francione are correct, welfarism is actually having a negative effect on the 
long-term success of the movement.45 This is a long-standing division, so 
attempting to reach a resolution in a single paper is impossible. Instead, this 
paper intends to move the theoretical debate in a slightly different direction. 
Some reflections on problems with both welfare and rights theory will be 
discussed, followed by a brief sketch of how some convergence between 





                                                 
43 Regan, above n 20, 361-2. 
44 Sarah Maddison and Sean Scalmer, Activist Wisdom (2006) 117. 
45 Lesli Bisgould, ‘Animal Oppression and the Pragmatist’ (1997) 3 Animal Law 39, 40-1; 
Gary L Francione, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement 
(1996) 6. 
           DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                            VOLUME 13 NO 1 190
1 Problems with Current Theories 
 
Both animal welfare and animal rights are too universalist.46 The main 
problem is their use of the term ‘animal’, which is largely meaningless as a 
concept. In common parlance, usually a distinction is drawn between 
‘humans’ and ‘animals’, with everything from an oyster to a chimpanzee 
placed in the latter category, despite the fact that humans are much more 
similar to chimpanzees than chimpanzees are to oysters.47  
 
Speaking of ‘animal’ rights or ‘animal’ welfare as though animals are an 
undifferentiated class is highly problematic for two main reasons. First, it 
allows opponents of the movement to caricature animal advocates as 
favouring fanciful projects such as the liberation of mosquitoes.48 These 
reactionary views aimed at denoting animal advocates as extremists have 
some currency in public debate. This eclipses the strong arguments of the 
movement on issues such as factory farming, vivisection, live exports and so 
on. Second, the term ‘animal’ is conceptually incoherent when referring to 
rights or welfare. Different animals (including humans) have different needs, 
desires and levels of consciousness. Some species are social and need 
opportunities for interaction, exercise and play. Other species are solitary or 
sedentary and therefore have different needs. Some species do not have a 
central nervous system or a brain; it is questionable whether we owe 
individuals within such a non-sentient species any moral obligations. Others, 
such as great apes, have a highly developed consciousness and ability to 
suffer, so our obligations towards them may be quite substantial. As James 
Rachels argues:49 
 
There is no such thing as moral standing simpliciter. Rather, moral standing 
is always moral standing with respect to some particular mode of treatment. 
A sentient being has moral standing with respect to not being tortured. A 
self-conscious being has moral standing with respect to not being 
humiliated. An autonomous being has moral standing with respect to not 
being coerced. 
 
                                                 
46 Lesley J Rogers and Gisela Kaplan, ‘All Animals are Not Equal: The Interface Between 
Scientific Knowledge and Legislation for Animal Rights’ in Cass R Sunstein and Martha C 
Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (2004) 175. 
47 Singer, above n 16, xiv. 
48 Steven M Wise, ‘Thunder Without Rain: A Review/Commentary of Gary L Francione’s 
Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement’ (1997) 3 Animal Law 
45, 50. 
49 James Rachels, ‘Drawing Lines’ in Cass R Sunstein and Martha C Nussbaum (eds), Animal 
Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (2004) 170 (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, rather than speaking of ‘animal’ rights or ‘animal’ welfare, we 
should speak specifically of gorilla rights, pig rights, dolphin rights and so 
on. These rights or welfare interests are likely to differ considerably from 
species to species. When discussing animal rights, we should always ask: 
which animal? And which rights? 
 
Of course, few animal advocates would contend that every animal, regardless 
of its species or circumstances, should have exactly the same entitlements. 
However, this nuance quickly collapses into the absolutism of ‘animal’ 
rights/welfare in public discourse. Activists should make a more concerted 
attempt to particularise their theories, claims and arguments to the individual 
circumstances and species about which they are campaigning.50 Such an 
attempt to particularise animals’ entitlements and move beyond the 
universalism of animal ‘rights’ and animal ‘welfare’ is found in the work of 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum. 
 
2 Capabilities Approach 
 
Nussbaum supports a political and moral theory known as the capabilities 
approach, which is roughly based on the work of Aristotle and was 
popularised by Amartya Sen in the field of welfare economics.51 The 
capabilities approach, in its application to humanity, argues that every human 
‘strives for a good, which is the exercise and maintenance of its characteristic 
form of life’.52 We can ethically evaluate certain capabilities as valuable, 
‘those without which a life would not be fully human’.53 These could include, 
for example, the ability to play, to reason, and to have relationships with 
other humans.54 Once we have a list of basic capabilities, people have a 
justified claim against individuals and governments that they ‘not be stunted 
or wasted, but given a chance to develop’.55  
 
To illustrate, let us say that we, as a society, determine that freedom of 
movement is a basic capability, without which we cannot strive for a good or 
become fully human. It would be wrong for an individual or government to 
                                                 
50 Peter Singer, ‘The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals’ (2002) 8 Animal Law 1, 25. 
51 Amartya Sen, ‘Capability and Well-Being’ in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds), 
The Quality of Life (1993) 30. 
52 Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Book Review: Animal Rights: The Need For a Theoretical Basis’ 
(2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 1506, 1535. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Steven White, ‘Animals and the Law: A New Legal Frontier?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne 
University Law Review 298, 307-8. 
55 Nussbaum, above n 53, 1536. 
           DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                            VOLUME 13 NO 1 192
restrict this freedom, for instance by arbitrarily preventing someone from 
moving house. Similarly, let us suppose that the capability to use practical 
reason is deemed a valuable human good. Governments would need to 
provide their people with basic levels of education to allow them the literacy 
and numeracy to exercise their capacity for practical reason. As these 
examples clarify, sometimes the capabilities approach will require positive 
intervention to lay the groundwork for the capability to flourish, such as by 
providing healthcare or education. On other occasions, the capabilities 
approach will require that individuals and governments simply leave others 
alone. 
 
The capabilities approach is similar to a rights-based view, and could be 
partly analysed as arguing for the provision of both positive and negative 
human rights. It contends that ‘providing support for these capabilities, up to 
a threshold level, is a central task of the nation-state’.56 This approach offers 
a theoretical foundation for respecting and promoting human rights, because 
failure to do so robs us of the very things that support human flourishing and 
make us who we are. 
 
Martha Nussbaum points out that animals also have a characteristic way of 
life and a set of capabilities. They pursue pleasure and avoid pain, exercise, 
eat, drink, play and form social bonds with other animals, to name only a 
few. For example, chickens form social ‘pecking orders’ and will naturally 
derive pleasure from dust bathing, perching and scratching around in the dirt. 
Thwarting these behaviours by confining hens to battery cages for their entire 
lives is unethical on the capabilities approach, because it precludes the hens 
from pursuing their way of life, ie the basic capabilities that make up their 
nature as chickens. 
 
Crucially, capabilities will differ from species to species, and therefore our 
obligations towards them will also differ. Steven Wise takes great apes as an 
example:57 
 
[C]himpanzees and bonobos are likely aware of themselves, of their 
environment, and of the future and past. They have wishes and desires and a 
complex family-based structure. Their culture and learning may be passed 
from one generation to the next within families. To forcibly remove 
chimpanzees and bonobos from their natural environment or to maintain 
them in artificial environments for human purposes is usually to deny them 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Steven M Wise, ‘Legal Rights for Nonhuman Animals: The Case for Chimpanzees and 
Bonobos’ (1996) 2 Animal Law 179, 185. 
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their culture and their ability to form important and social relationships. 
This deprives them of a substantial portion of what gives meaning to their 
lives. 
 
Other species that do not have the cognitive or relational capabilities of great 
apes may not be deprived of anything valuable by being kept in human 
environments, for example as pets. Thus, what may be considered a gross 
violation of animal capabilities in one context may be perfectly legitimate in 
another. This creates ambiguity but is more realistic than the false certainty 
provided by universalist views. 
 
In order to determine the nature of animal capabilities, reference to ‘current 
scientific knowledge on the biology and behavior of different species’ is 
required.58 Ethical evaluation is also necessary to determine what contributes 
to the flourishing and well-being of the characteristic form of life experienced 
by different species. 
 
Aside from the universality of the two major theories, the capabilities 
approach is superior to the animal welfare and animal rights approaches for 
other reasons. The welfare approach is inadequate because it provides no 
structural or institutional critique of practices that harm animals. On Peter 
Singer’s utilitarian approach, welfarism also fails to treat individual animals 
as ends rather than means, preferring instead to pursue the overall best 
consequences even if it means deprivation of the interests of some 
individuals. The rights approach is inadequate because it is too simplistic. 
Gary Francione argues that all sentient animals should have only one right: 
the right not to be treated as things.59 The capabilities approach has the 
advantage of being more nuanced, and recognising that different animals may 
have different rights, depending on what contributes to their unique ways of 
living. In fact, some animals may not have any rights at all. Whereas the 
rights approach seeks to abolish all institutions that use animals for human 
purposes, the capabilities approach is not so absolutist. Some institutions that 
respect animal capabilities may be acceptable, while others may need to be 
eradicated. 
 
Despite the superiority of the capabilities approach at a theoretical level, 
there are some potential problems with its implementation into law. Because 
it differs from species to species and requires constant revision as new 
scientific evidence comes to light, it may create considerable complexity 
                                                 
58 Rogers and Kaplan, above n 47. 
59 Francione, above n 13, xxix. 
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from a regulatory point of view. Obviously, as Nussbaum herself recognises, 
more academic work needs to be done around the application of the 
capabilities approach to animals. Which capabilities should be considered 
valuable? To what extent are individual humans and governments required to 
promote animal capabilities? How can capabilities be supported at a 
legislative level without creating a convoluted regulatory maze? These are 
difficult questions that require ongoing debate and discussion. However, such 
discussion will hopefully lead to a more fruitful theoretical basis for animal 
advocacy than the simplistic doctrines of animal welfare or rights. 
 
II HOW IS THE LAW RELEVANT TO THE CAUSE? 
 
Part I explained the origin and philosophy of the modern animal protection 
movement. It noted the profound influence of Peter Singer and Tom Regan 
and the present-day split between supporters of animal welfare and 
proponents of animal rights. A sketch was then provided of an alternative to 
the welfare/rights dichotomy in the form of Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach. By now, the first primary question of this paper should be 
answered: what is the animal protection cause? In this Part, the second 
primary question will be resolved: how is the law relevant to the cause? 
 
It did not take long after the meteoric rise of the animal protection movement 
for activists to realise that law is a crucial site of animal exploitation. The law 
institutionalises and routinely excuses animal cruelty and has erected what 
sometimes seems an impenetrable barrier to effective change. Indeed, 
animals are lawfully ‘starved, terrorised, beaten, confined, abused and 
violated’.60 In this Part, a brief outline will be given of the rise of ‘animal 
law’ within the United States. Then, a few basic problems with the legal 
regime governing animals in Australia will be discussed. The inadequacy of 
Australian animal statutes should clearly show why the law is a crucial site 
for advocacy and agitation. 
 
 A The Rise of Animal Law 
 
In recognition of the importance of law to the goals of the animal protection 
movement, activist animal lawyers and the discipline of ‘animal law’ 
emerged in the United States soon after the arrival of the broader movement 
itself. Legal scholars such as Steven Wise, David Favre and Gary Francione 
planted the seeds that have blossomed into over 90 American animal law 
courses, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, scholarly journals and textbooks 
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dedicated to animal law, animal law bar associations, conferences, seminars, 
inter-university competitions and student groups.61 Prominent universities 
including Harvard and Stanford teach animal law, a testament to how 
mainstream it has become.62  
 
Animal law has also made its mark elsewhere, with courses available in New 
Zealand, Canada, the UK, Switzerland, Israel and China.63 Germany became 
the first country to officially recognise animals as worthy of protection in its 
national Constitution.64 However, despite its long-standing status in the 
United States and growing status elsewhere, Australian lawyers have only 
recently become involved in the animal law juggernaut, as outlined at the 
beginning of this paper. Disappointingly, though, the treatment of animals in 
Australia and the defects in our animal laws are no less dire than in the 
United States. 
 
 1 Animal Protection Law in Australia 
 
‘Animal’ is usually defined in legislation so as to exclude humans from the 
definition, reflecting a hierarchical, pre-Darwinian metaphysics.65 Domestic 
animals, including farm animals, are the absolute property of their owners. 
Property in wildlife, however, is vested in the Crown but can be transferred to 
others through a licensing scheme.66 As such, the law primarily constructs 
animals as instruments for the use and enjoyment of humans. Yet the law 
thankfully recognises that animals, unlike inanimate objects, have interests in 
avoiding suffering that ought to be protected. The discussion below will 
mainly concentrate on farm animals, but many of the arguments also apply to 
animals used for other purposes. 
 
                                                 
61 Laura Ireland Moore, ‘A Review of Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions’ 
(2005) 11 Animal Law 311, 312; Geoff Bloom, ‘Animal law graduates to legal discipline: 
anyone interested in an LLM (Animal Law)?’ (2004) 42(5) Law Society Journal 19, 19-20; 
White, above n 55, 299. 
62 Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal Law Courses (2007) <www.aldf.org/content/index. 
php?pid=83> at 1 June 2008. 
63 Voiceless, above n 3. 
64 Article 20a of the German Basic Law. See Kate Nattrass, ‘“… Und Die Tiere”: 
Constitutional Protection for Germany’s Animals’ (2004) 10 Animal Law 283. 
65 See, eg, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 528, which 
defines ‘animal’ as ‘any member, alive or dead, of the animal kingdom (other than a human 
being)’. 
66 Butterworths, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (at 17 October 2007) 20 Animals, ‘1 Property in 
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As there is no federal constitutional power over animals, the treatment of 
animals is primarily governed by welfare statutes in the States and 
Territories.67 There is also specific legislation governing certain types of 
animals, such as the Animal Research Act 1985 (NSW) and the Wildlife Act 
1975 (Vic). Each State’s primary animal welfare statute prohibits narrowly 
defined acts of cruelty on animals. For example, Queensland law makes it an 
offence for anyone to cause an animal pain that, in the circumstances, is 
‘unjustifiable, unnecessary or unreasonable’.68 Offences so framed are 
obviously imprecise and allow for plenty of definitional wriggle room. One 
person’s conception of ‘unnecessary’ or ‘unreasonable’ pain can be 
dramatically different from another’s. 
 
Significantly, most animals are expressly excluded from the statutes’ 
protection and governed instead by ‘Codes of Practice’. For example, section 
6 of the Victorian Act states that the Act does not apply to ‘any act or 
practice with respect to the farming, transport, sale or killing of any farm 
animal which is carried out in accordance with a Code of Practice’.69 Thus, 
hundreds of millions of animals every year are excluded from our animal 
welfare laws. This means the statutes’ usefulness is largely limited to isolated 
acts of cruelty committed against domestic pets, as opposed to large-scale 
systemic cruelty in institutions of food, science and sport. 
 
The Codes of Practice do not provide adequate protection for Australia’s 
farm animals (or any other class of animals governed by Codes). They are 
created under the auspices of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council, 
whose self-described objective is ‘to develop and promote sustainable, 
innovative and profitable agriculture, fisheries/aquaculture, food and forestry 
industries’.70 There are no animal welfare representatives on the Committee 
that creates the Codes; rather, the RSPCA and Animals Australia are merely 
‘consulted’ during the process.71 The Codes are legally unenforceable 
everywhere other than South Australia, so non-compliance does not of itself 
                                                 
67 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic); Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 
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constitute an offence.72 Furthermore, the welfare standards within the Codes 
are set very low. Practices such as mulesing, castration and tail docking 
without pain relief continue unabated.73 In this way, acts that would 
constitute cruelty offences if carried out on domestic pets are given the law’s 
imprimatur when carried out on farm animals.74 
 
Aside from the manifest deficiencies in the Code system, Australia’s animal 
protection statutes are also difficult to enforce. State Departments of Primary 
Industries are empowered to enforce the Acts against non-compliant industry 
groups, yet these Departments consider their ‘mission’ to be the 
maximisation of animal industry economic performance.75 Therefore, only 
the RSPCA is able to play a meaningful enforcement role, yet the RSPCA is 
sorely lacking in the requisite funds to enforce a large public interest 
statute.76 Enforcement is also made difficult by the low penalties for offences. 
In South Australia, the only State in which failure to comply with a Code of 
Practice is an offence, the maximum penalty for non-compliance is a mere 
$1,250.77 Even in States where the maximum penalty for infringement of the 
main cruelty offence is over $10,000 for corporations,78 such amounts 
provide inadequate deterrent for multi-million dollar companies. Power to 
inspect premises is also tightly curtailed in the legislation and provides high 
thresholds for entry, making it difficult to detect and prevent cruelty.79 
 
Despite major shortcomings in animal law, of which only a few have been 
mentioned, politicians of both major parties have proven stubbornly resistant 
to change. In 2005, Andrew Bartlett of the Australian Democrats attempted to 
create a unified and consistent federal approach to animal welfare that would 
                                                 
72 Department for Environment and Heritage, Codes of Practice (2007) <http://www. 
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have provided protection for animals currently excluded from state-level 
statutes.80 The proposed National Animal Welfare Bill 2005 (Cth) made no 
attempt to abolish the property status of animals, grant animals rights, or 
query the legitimacy of institutions that use animals for human purposes. 
However, the Senate Committee that examined the Bill comprehensively 
rejected it and expressed support for the status quo.81 
 
It should now be clear that animal protection law in Australia embodies the 
welfarist rather than the rights view,82 and tepidly at that. It exempts farm 
animals, which is unjustifiable on principle but convenient economically, and 
does very little to challenge institutional cruelty. What remains of its 
protective ambit is difficult to enforce, and the political will to rectify the 
problems is sorely lacking.83 
 
Hopefully this discussion has illustrated the relevance of the law to the 
animal protection cause. The need for Australian lawyers to support the 
movement has never been more acute. It therefore remains for Part III to 
explore how lawyers can bring their skills to bear for the advancement of 
animals. 
 
III WHAT CAN AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS DO? 
 
[E]ach time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new “entity”, 
the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable. This is 
partly because until the rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot see it as 
anything but a thing for the use of “us”—those who are holding rights at the 
time.84  
 
In this Part, the third and final primary question will be answered: what can 
Australian lawyers do to support the cause? In order to do this, Part III is 
broken into three sections. Part IIIA will appraise the obstacles in the way of 
the animal protection movement. Without taking stock of the barriers and 
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obstacles, it is impossible to adequately grasp the role of lawyers and the 
nature of the challenges lawyers face. Part IIIB will examine the nature of 
effective lawyering by outlining the skills lawyers bring to cause advocacy. 
Finally, Part IIIC will apply the earlier discussion to a case study on battery 
hens. This case study will provide a concrete, practical example of how 
lawyers can assist the animal protection cause. 
 
 A Appraising the Obstacles 
 
The role of lawyers within any social justice movement will differ depending 
on the nature of the opposition to the movement. A cause with widespread 
public support and well-respected lobby groups may require a different style 
of lawyer advocacy than an unpopular cause widely viewed as ‘extremist’ 
that faces wealthy and powerful opponents.  
 
Aside from its implications for a lawyer’s role, analysis of obstacles is also 
important because, without a sober appreciation of forces that resist change, 
lawyers in the animal protection movement may become disillusioned and 
burn out.85 Without appraising the movement’s obstacles, a young, hopeful 
idealist could gradually transform into a jaded cynic. 
 
The animal protection movement faces a number of barriers that can at times 
seem insurmountable. The first is the limitation inherent to legal advocacy. 
Since the rise of critical legal scholarship and postmodernism, the law is 
widely viewed as a clumsy vehicle for bringing about social change.86 Rather 
than the law driving progression, legal change usually reflects progress that 
has already occurred in wider society and merely confirms that progress.87 
Law is based on the ethical beliefs of society rather than being actively 
formative of such beliefs.88 However, a purely reactionary conception of law 
would be simplistic. Research has shown that most people uncritically accept 
the laws and standards of their culture, which indicates that a change in the 
law may be able to produce a change in social values.89 Still, a legal change 
that is deeply unpopular is unlikely to produce the desired effect on social 
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attitudes. Changing the law, albeit important, will always be ancillary to the 
need to challenge and alter moral beliefs. 
 
Another barrier is economic. In Australia, the egg and chicken meat 
industries alone are worth several billion dollars per year.90 Steven Wise 
points out that our societies are so economically enmeshed in the use of 
animals that ‘one cannot live and not support the abuse’.91 Examples of 
products that contain animals include fertiliser, plastic, crayons, soaps, 
shaving cream, paper, matches and tyres.92 Challenging practices that 
contribute so much to human economies is difficult. Paul Waldau notes that 
‘persuading power holders to relinquish what traditional moral authorities 
have repeatedly assured them was properly their private property will likely 
never be an easy task’.93  
 
There are also religious and cultural barriers. The dominant view within the 
Judeo-Christian tradition is that humans have dominion over all other 
animals, which justifies almost any treatment of them short of the egregious. 
While this is changing somewhat,94 active concern for animals remains a 
minority strand in most religious communities. Culturally, a large obstacle in 
Australia is the trenchant mythology around farmers. Despite the gradual 
decline of the family farm brought about by the increasing corporatisation of 
animal agriculture, a critique of farming practices could be interpreted as an 
attack on the moral integrity of farmers, amounting to cultural blasphemy. 
 
Historical obstacles are also powerful. The historical ideas of animals as 
inferior and existing for the sake of humanity remain popular. Moreover, in 
recent history it was mainstream to treat some humans in the ways that we 
currently treat animals, for instance through subjecting them to ‘medical 
experimentation, inhumane captivity, and forced performances for public 
amusement’.95 Since humans are capable of inflicting unspeakable atrocities 
on other humans, it is hardly surprising that we continue to inflict atrocities 
on members of other species. 
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Furthermore, there are psychological barriers to achieving change. Humans 
are ‘accustomed… to treating… animals as mere means to our ends’.96 
Steven Bartlett argues that psychological and conceptual blocks make our 
resistance to animal rights ‘somewhere between difficult to practically 
impossible’.97 Humans are tribal animals that have always drawn sharp 
boundaries around their moral communities.98 The animal protection 
movement advocates that we undertake the Herculean task of radically 
extending this boundary. 
 
Animal advocates are drawn from constituencies that ordinarily carry cultural 
power; the typical animal protectionist is a white, tertiary-educated, urban 
professional.99 Yet opponents of the movement regularly dismiss animal 
activists as extremists and radicals in an attempt to push animal protection 
issues out to the margins.100 The movement comes up against wealthy, 
influential and revered opponents such as rural industry lobby groups and the 
biomedical research establishment, against which it is difficult to compete for 
public support. 
 
Last, animals differ from many other marginalised groups in that they cannot 
advocate for themselves. It has been noted that the children’s rights 
movement is asserted in a ‘world of adult power’.101 In a similar way, 
animals depend on the support and advocacy of human adults. Peter Singer 
points out that ‘[t]he less able a group is to stand up and organize against 
oppression, the more easily it is oppressed’.102 
 
It is important to recognise that, despite these barriers, a growing number of 
people are actively challenging the dominant paradigms and undermining the 
strength of the movement’s opponents, not least of which are lawyers. The 
next section will discuss the nature of effective lawyer advocacy and apply 
some of the discussion to the animal protection movement. This discussion 
should assist in setting up Part IIIC, which analyses lawyers’ role in 
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achieving change for animals by grounding the earlier discussion in a case 
study. 
 




Effective lawyer advocacy is built upon the particular skill set that lawyers 
possess. In order to convince the general public, judges or the legislature to 
believe in a cause, members of any advocacy group must be able to think 
objectively about the arguments on both sides of an issue.103 They must be 
able to clearly identify their goals and research the facts and law that will 
advance them. After being armed with helpful research, they must be able to 
communicate succinctly and effectively to get across their point of view in 
the most persuasive manner. They must be driven by passion and empathy.104 
They must collaborate with like-minded activist networks to achieve the 
strongest possible team of advocates.105 
 
Lawyers have been trained both at university and in the workforce to have 
some of the above skills. First, lawyers are skilled at advocacy. They are 
trained to exploit strengths in their clients’ arguments and weaknesses in their 
opponents’ arguments by convincingly articulating a case. Second, lawyers 
are skilled at communicating clearly and logically, sometimes both in written 
and oral form. Despite lawyers’ reputation for verbosity, young lawyers are 
increasingly trained to communicate succinctly and in plain English. Third, 
lawyers are skilled at research. Most lawyers are able to get to the heart of an 
issue by avoiding extraneous detail and can seek out the facts and law 
necessary to build an argument. Last, lawyers have analytical and objective 
thinking skills. Lawyers are trained to see both sides of an argument and put 
aside personal prejudices and biases, at least until they argue for a particular 
side. 
 
Of course, many non-lawyer advocates have the same skills. Lawyers are 
neither sufficient nor strictly necessary for a cause to be successful. 
Furthermore, some lawyers may have qualities that detract from their 
usefulness, such as stubbornness, arrogance, or a tendency to view social 
problems entirely in legal terms. Nevertheless, provided lawyers collaborate 
and work alongside other activists, and do not dominate or override the 
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important skills of others, lawyers’ training and skills can make them 
indispensable in the pursuit of social justice. For example, Joseph Hawes 
argues that lawyers were ‘the most effective element’ in the children’s rights 
movement in the United States.106     
 
2 Working within Existing Structures 
 
Effective lawyer advocacy is also informed by the social position of lawyers. 
Lawyers are often found in the upper echelons of politics and business. 
Despite being the target of jokes that portray them as untrustworthy and 
greedy, lawyers are widely respected. As such, lawyers perhaps more than 
other activists have a capacity to achieve change within the system, using 
existing channels of power. Because lawyers understand the justice system, 
they are well placed to take advantage of its structures for the benefit of the 
marginalised, such as through lobbying politicians and advancing public 
interest litigation. Working for change within existing structures of power is 
derided by some theorists as a ‘doomed, moderate’ approach that requires too 
much compromise with an unjust system.107 However, Maddison and 
Scalmer note the possibilities of radical and moderate wings of a movement 
employing a ‘division of labour’:108 
 
[R]adicals demand attention and provoke antipathy. Their adventures shake 
up the powerful and foment controversy; their interventions polarise and 
publicise. In contrast, reformists offer a sane, rational alternative. They cool 
passions with sensible suggestions. They seek the practical compromise. In 
this way, the revolutionary creates a space where the moderate can 
bargain. Governments fear the extremists and meet with the reformists. 
Strategic divisions within the movement can become, briefly, a kind of 
political resource. 
 
Lawyers are in a strong position to act as a ‘moderate wing’ of the animal 
protection movement. Their admission oath to obey and uphold the law 
makes radical civil disobedience difficult. Indeed, by temperament and 
training most lawyers are inclined to obey the law anyway and work for 
change from within. While other animal activists may continue to generate 
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controversy through illegal acts such as breaking into factory farms,109 
lawyers can provide a cool voice of reason to temper the perception of animal 
advocates as extremists.  
 
The legal system and the law are inherently conservative. The law preserves 
the status quo and is not amenable to revolutionary arguments. The shock and 
awe tactics of some wings of the animal protection movement work better for 
changing social attitudes. These wings confront people with footage of 
cruelty, appeal to their emotions, and stir up outrage and compassion. The 
law does not respond in the same way as the general public to emotive 
appeals, so a rough division of labour within the movement seems 
worthwhile. 
 
3 Learning from Others 
 
Effective lawyer advocates also learn from other social justice movements. A 
particularly successful cause of late is the environmental movement. The 
environmental movement demonstrates the important role of science in legal 
argument. The presentation of legal arguments backed up by detailed and 
accurate ecological science and empirical research has contributed 
significantly to the success of environmentalism in the law.110 Similarly, 
environmentalists have cleverly packaged some arguments in human-centred 
terms, even while trying to extend consideration to non-human entities. We 
have seen this recently with arguments that climate change will have 
devastating effects on human communities, as well as arguments around 
impacts on human health and tourism if the environment is not protected.111 
 
Animal lawyers are advised to use similar strategies wherever possible. For 
example arguments for greater penalties in animal welfare statutes could be 
based on research that links violence against animals to violence against 
humans.112  
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Legal arguments for animal protection generally should be supported by 
rigorous research in veterinary science, biology, psychology and so on.113 By 
co-opting the authoritative discourse of science to the animal protection 
cause, the movement will achieve legal success much more quickly than if it 




Last, effective lawyer advocacy is grounded in a strong theory and explicit 
goal. A lawyer who supports animal welfarism will have a different goal than 
a lawyer who supports animal rights. This paper has offered the capabilities 
approach as a theoretical structure. Accordingly, for those who agree with the 
capabilities approach, effective lawyer advocacy will be consistent with the 
desire to allow animals the space to flourish in their characteristic form of 
life. For advocates who reject the capabilities approach, their lawyering 
should be consistent with whatever theory they support. 
 
 C Battery Hens 
 
Part IIIC will show how lawyers can apply their skills to a practical project 
for the benefit of animals. 
 
1 Introduction to the Problem 
 
Over 13 million hens are used for egg production in Australian farms at any 
given time. Approximately 80% of these hens are kept in battery cages while 
the remainder are kept in ‘barn’ or ‘free range’ systems that allow hens some 
modicum of freedom of movement. 
 
Battery hens are kept indoors in large sheds for the duration of their lives. 
They are housed in barren wire cages with up to five other chickens, 
providing each chicken with individual space of less than an A4 sheet of 
paper. This is the closest confinement of any form of animal agriculture. 
Battery hens are also subjected to ‘beak trimming’, a procedure that painfully 
removes a portion of their sensitive beaks without anaesthetic. This is 
undertaken in order to prevent cannibalism, itself a corollary of overcrowding 
and stress. 
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The intensive nature of the farming leads to a number of significant welfare 
problems. The battery cage prevents hens from carrying out their most basic 
behavioural needs, such as stretching their wings, perching, dust-bathing and 
laying eggs in nests. According to the European Scientific Veterinary 
Committee (ESVC), the battery cage has ‘inherent severe disadvantages for 
the welfare of hens’ including the prevention or modification of natural 
behaviours, increased fear, and bone weakness caused by lack of 
movement.114 A substantial number of battery hens have broken bones by the 
time they are slaughtered, and experience ‘high fear levels’ and ‘substantial 
stress responses’ when being handled by humans during the slaughter 
process.115 It is no wonder that the ESVC states that ‘[a] better system for 
housing hens is clearly needed’.116 
 
2 Progress Already Made 
 
Of all issues in farm animal welfare, the plight of battery hens is probably the 
most widely understood by the Australian public. Animal activists have 
campaigned on battery hens for quite some time. The RSPCA recently 
launched an advertising campaign on television with the slogan ‘don’t make 
hens pay for your eggs’.117 Animals Australia and the various Animal 
Liberation groups vigorously campaign on this issue as well. 
 
The wider availability of free-range eggs in Australian supermarkets is 
testament to the growing consumer awareness of cruel practices in the egg 
farming industry. This awareness has also entered our universities. The 
University of Newcastle recently announced that it would no longer serve 
cage-laid eggs on campus. Students at other Australian universities are 
currently campaigning to have their campuses provide similar undertakings. 
 
Governments are beginning to take notice. The Australian Capital Territory 
Government recently granted major egg producer Pace Farms $1 million to 
make the transition from battery farming to barn farming, which would allow 
                                                 
114 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Report of the Scientific Veterinary Committee 
Animal Welfare Section on the Welfare of Laying Hens’ (1996) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
food/fs/sc/oldcomm4/out33_en.pdf> 109 at 1 June 2008. 
115 J L Barnett and E A Newman, ‘Review of welfare research in the laying hen and the 
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Journal of Agricultural Research 385, 392-4. 
116 Commission of the European Communities, above n 115, 103. See also M Baxter, ‘The 
welfare problems of laying hens in battery cages’ (1994) 134(24) The Veterinary Record 614-
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hens to roam around inside a shed. According to Chief Minister Jon 
Stanhope, this was designed to ‘phase out battery egg production in the ACT’ 
and change the purchasing behaviour of ACT residents.118 
 
Internationally, there has been significant advancement in this area. The 
conventional battery cages that exist in Australia are currently being phased 
out in the European Union under Council Directive 1999/74/EC, with a total 
ban to be in place by 2012.  All cage systems are effectively prohibited in 
Switzerland.119  Other countries that have taken steps to ban or phase out the 
barren battery cage include Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Norway, Germany 
and Austria.120 
 
Unfortunately no Australian government has yet supported an outright ban on 
battery cages. Instead, governments tend to support piecemeal and largely 
useless measures such as increasing cage space by minuscule proportions. 
For example, in 2001 the cage space allowance for each hen under the Code 
of Practice for the Welfare of Poultry was increased from 450cm2 to 550cm2, 
with an allowance of 20 years from the date of manufacture or until 1 January 
2008 (whichever is the later) for producers to decommission or modify the 
smaller cages.121  
 
Lawyers and other concerned advocates need to apply significant pressure to 
governments to follow the lead of European nations and implement a phased-
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3 Worth Pursuing? 
 
There are a number of reasons why Australian animal lawyers should support 
the abolition of the battery cage. 
 
This project is consistent with the capabilities approach. The very behaviours 
that constitute a chicken’s natural life—scratching, perching, dust-bathing 
and so on—are thwarted by the battery cage. 
 
Because there is already public knowledge of the issue and a considerable 
amount of campaigning that has already been underway, lawyers do not have 
to reinvent the wheel. Advocates can draw upon the substantial repository of 
local and international know-how, particularly from European organisations 
that pressured the European Union to phase out battery cages. 
 
Intensive farming has always been and will continue to be a major 
battleground in relation to animal protection. The entire edifice of factory 
farming will not crumble in the short term, so animal advocates must attack 
points of weakness in the system rather than fight to pull down the whole 
structure. Battery cages are a point of weakness due to the significant 
pressure that has already been placed on industry. It is also one of the few 
areas in farming where governments have displayed some willingness to 
consider reform. 
 
4 Lawyers’ Role in the Project 
 
Lawyers have a significant role to play in abolishing battery cages in 
Australia. 
 
Lawyers should analyse and think objectively about the likely arguments of 
their opponents. It is possible that some opponents may deny that battery 
hens suffer.122 However, opposition to a ban will likely focus on two 
arguments. The first is economic. This argument will draw attention to the 
higher price consumers will be forced to pay for eggs and the alleged 
infeasibility of servicing consumer demand through free range farming. The 
second is welfarist. This argument will claim that free range farming has 
welfare problems as well. Accordingly, this argument will attempt to roughly 
equate all forms of egg production in the hope that consumers and 
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governments will shrug their shoulders and opt for maintenance of the status 
quo. 
 
Such arguments need to be tackled directly rather than ignored or sidelined. 
The scientific research on hen welfare should be comprehensively analysed, 
even the research that downplays the problems with battery cages and 
exaggerates the problems with free range systems. Similarly, the economic 
data on the cost of implementing a battery cage ban should be examined, and 
surveys should be conducted to support the argument that consumers will pay 
extra for eggs that are produced more ethically. Because these issues are 
outside a lawyer’s expertise, it is perhaps worth outsourcing these matters to 
people with scientific, economic and marketing knowledge. 
 
Lawyers should use their research skills to ascertain how gains have been 
made for battery hens in overseas jurisdictions and apply those lessons in the 
Australian context. After learning from overseas practitioners, Australian 
lawyers should use their skills in communication and advocacy to present the 
case for the abolition of battery cages logically and persuasively, identifying 
all the strongest arguments and recording them clearly in submissions to 
relevant government bodies. 
 
Lawyers should collaborate with existing organisations that are actively 
campaigning on battery hens, such as Animals Australia, Voiceless, the 
RSPCA and various state-based Animal Liberation groups. Some of these 
organisations already have in-house lawyers, but external lawyers can offer 
pro bono services to assist them, as some leading Australian law firms are 
already doing. Most of the abovementioned groups have put considerable 
effort into cultivating an ‘insider’ image, representing themselves as 
moderate, reasonable and worth consulting on animal issues. Increasing the 
number of lawyers in these bodies can only assist in further consolidating 
their reputation as sensible organisations, hopefully without detracting from 
the passion and vigour with which they advocate for the animal protection 
cause. 
 
Moreover, lawyers could join dedicated bodies such as the Barristers’ Animal 
Welfare Panel and Lawyers for Animals in Victoria. Lawyers for Animals is 
experienced at submission writing and lobbying all levels of government, 
while the Barristers’ Animal Welfare Panel has generated formidable 
influence in litigation, lobbying, and advising governments, political parties 
and animal organisations. Drawing upon the human resources and expertise 
of these and other like bodies will substantially increase the chances of 
lawyers succeeding on projects such as the abolition of the battery cage. 
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Lawyers should identify parties and individuals within Australian parliaments 
that will support the cage’s abolition.123 This may include the Australian 
Greens, who already support the phase-out of intensive farming practices,124 
and individual members from the two major political parties. Lawyers should 
notify these people of the campaign, in order to build support within 
Australian legislatures. 
 
Lawyers should utilise the media in conjunction with other campaign 
supporters to generate favourable public sentiment. Lawyers should submit 
opinion pieces, press releases and letters to the editor. Wherever possible they 
should use emotion to generate a scandal and marshal sympathy,125 such as 
by telling stories of particularly appalling cruelty found inside factory farms. 
It is perhaps advisable to launch a media campaign prior to a legislative 
campaign so that there is a spotlight on governments, making it difficult for 




It has been observed that every social movement goes through three stages: 
ridicule, discussion and ultimately, adoption.126 While still ridiculed in some 
quarters, the animal protection movement is now firmly in the ‘discussion’ 
phase amongst Australian lawyers. Justice Michael Kirby has noted that 
concerns about animal welfare ‘are clearly legitimate matters of public debate 
across the nation’.127 
 
Even if particular projects such as the abolition of the battery cage are not 
initially successful in legal terms, they will still have generated publicity, 
raised consciousness of the plight of animals and mobilised the movement, 
all of which lay the groundwork for more effective legal activism in the 
future.128 With the hard work and dedication of animal lawyers, working 
alongside other activists, their vision of a more just, humane and 
compassionate society may one day be reflected in our statute books. This 
will make the struggles, disappointments and frustrations of lawyering for 
animals worthwhile. 
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